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ABSTRACT
Western philosophy’s frequent conflation and denigration of animals, human others, embodiment and emotions has been powerfully
documented over the past many decades. I explore the impact of this
fear and loathing of the body, a somatophobia that infects much of
the Western philosophical canon and its orientation toward people
of color, white women, and animals. As I share reflections that are
meant to enact and reveal an embodied pragmatism, I consider the
potential of our love for dogs to ground a more embodied philosophical approach to love. Rooted in my own journey (as philosopher and
dog lover), I pose questions about the significance of love and dogs
both to the academy, and to flesh and blood theorists. How might our
love for dogs support a more attentive, embodied engagement with
both the world and the world of ideas?

Catherine Bailey
Western Michigan University

Volume 23, Issue 1
Winter 2019
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/

31
Catherine Bailey

“I have seen Ben place his nose meticulously into the
shallow dampness of a deer’s hoofprint and shut his
eyes as if listening. But it is a smell he is listening to.
The wild, high music of smell that we know so little
about” (Mary Oliver 2013, 111).
“So, then, one has no hope of understanding the nature
of knowledge, reality, goodness, love, or beauty unless
one recognizes the distinction between soul and body;
and one has no hope of attaining any of these unless
one works hard on freeing the soul from the lazy, vulgar, beguiling body. A philosopher is someone who is
committed to doing just that” (Elizabeth V. Spelman
1982, 113).
As he pondered tolerance and pluralism, American pragmatist William James made an audacious interspecies comparison:
“Take our dogs and ourselves, connected as we are by
a tie more intimate than most ties in this world; and
yet, outside of that tie of friendly fondness, how insensible, each of us, to all that makes life significant for
the other!—we to the rapture of bones under hedges,
or smells of trees and lamp-posts, they to the delights
of literature and art” (1899, 76).
I too exercise my empathetic imagination as I walk with my
dogs. The cool sidewalk under my four toughened paws, the
breeze lifting my hound’s ears, my twitching nostrils filling
with the perfume of wormy earth, crocus shoots, rabbit dung.
Like James, I am a philosopher who pays attention to dogs. Or
is it more accurate to say that I used to be a philosopher, before
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I fell in love with dogs? Certainly, the way I speak of dogs illustrates the sort of marginal (non-) philosopher I have become.
It has taken me nearly twenty years to abandon the ethereal
realms of Plato and Descartes and begin to relax into pragmatism’s full-bodied embrace. It is surely no accident that I adopted William James and Olive—a plucky mutt whose Bassett
chassis is splotched with Springer Spaniel—at about the same
time. The dog’s world is the antithesis of the philosophical
heights first revealed to me in college. That was an airy fantasyland, full of exotic birds, soaring overhead to discern general
principles and diluted universality. By contrast, the pragmatist’s wet nose caresses the ground, pokes into the particularities, keeping the priorities of stomach and hearth ever in view.
To become a philosopher who loves dogs, and so takes them
seriously, is to invite the dissolution of taken for granted dichotomies of knowledge, sense and cognition. It is to accept
the violation of boundary between the physical and conceptual. Here, truth and falsity are not opposites so much as different flavors. A dog sees with her nose and reads with her
tongue. She claims no objective distance, no knowing that is
not internal, no thinking that is not already psycho-physical.
She ingests with every sense organ and maps that information
into her body. The dog is a scavenger not only of what might
be eaten, but also of every facet of experience that could be
coaxed of just a little more juice. The quest for truth is transformed into a commitment to the fullness of reality.
Truth, after all, is not the point. This vibrant journey of
sweat and sapidity reflects the integrity of experience in and of
itself. Whether it is to be marked as true or false, or justified or
unjustified, is as beside the point as the puny sign marking the
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source of the Niagara Falls. In this doggy, pragmatist iteration,
humans do not serve truth, bow to it, or kiss its ring. Rather,
truth is our plaything, our tool, to be filled like a cook pot, or
trusted like a well-worn hammer. Truth is a red balloon we follow with our gaze as it slips out of view. It is a lead pipe that
can serve as crow bar, window prop or baseball bat. There is
no knowing what it is in advance, or in essentialist or absolutist
terms, but this no longer matters to us, for we have moved into
the shadows beyond the Enlightenment. As one pragmatist puts
it, following Rorty, “We should no longer rely on and believe in
foundations, we should no longer worship anything, . . . and we
should finally realize that our self, our language, and our community are governed by contingency” (Schulenberg 2007, 7).
My own journey away from enlightenment-steeped, analytically-tinged academic philosophy has been a glorious devolution into dogness, a game of wrestling with dualisms: mind
and body, thinking and feeling, high and low culture. It’s been
a trajectory marked by fumblings with lofty theory and sticky
immersions in the ignoble swamps of pop psychology. I watch
brittle concepts crash to earth and harvest them as firewood as
I renovate my life into a classroom where I permit myself to
indulge my fascination for the dog eating the philosophy book
as well as the contents of the book itself. The dog ate my homework? Indeed. And for the pragmatist, it is no wonder we resort
to ingestion analogies when we are at our most philosophical.
We want to chew on it a while. Drink it in. And after that, it is
sometimes still hard to swallow. What does it say of us that our
language both hides and proclaims the passionately embodied
nature of such epistemological urges?
The simultaneous disguising and disclosure of the bodily
maps neatly onto a similarly paradoxical orientation toward
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non-human animals, whom we both adore and despise. And,
by extension, the ambivalence about the body is not just coincidental with vacillations about love as a worthy subject, but
adheres to it. We cannot quite decide if love is a highfalutin
spiritual hovering in the clouds or a sweaty, heaving bodily
one. Because love straddles those boundaries so teeteringly, it
defies many academic and intellectual categories, those gaping
boxes prepared to swallow only what will be neatly contained.
This ambivalence is noticeable even in some of the contemporary philosophies that have bravely faced the bogeyman, as has
Alan Soble in The Philosophy of Sex and Love. As I describe
below, despite his eclectic approach, he handles love mostly at
arm’s length; the better to add “logical rigor to the discussion
of love” (Soble 1998, ixx), though he also labors to reach over
philosophy to touch the bodies waiting on the other side.
In a perverse way, bodily as they are, animals sometimes
do represent love for humans, including how we may learn to
enact the story of love. The child clings to her stuffed toy bear
as someone she loves, but it is a love of consumption. She can
stroke or destroy this animal proxy as she wishes, control it,
dress it up, or fling it into the bushes. Is it so different from lap
dogs, or even from how we discursively frame wild animals,
bending them to our concepts, categories and narratives; for
example, appropriating the lion for his majestic individualism?
Does our overwriting of such beings reflect our frustration and
failure at connecting to, controlling and escaping our own animal embodiment? How do our beliefs about animal love, about
how we love them and how they love each other and us, give
shape to our thoughts about human love?
And when it comes to experiencing animals’ feelings, is it all
just projection anyway? Are our accounts of animal and human
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love merely nested narratives based on presumption, layers of
projection functioning like funhouse mirrors but grounded in
very little? As one unabashed dog lover reflects:
“When a dog is rolling in fresh-cut grass, the pleasure
on her face is unmistakable. No one could be wrong in
saying that what she is feeling is akin to what any of us
(though less often, perhaps) may feel. The words used
to describe the emotion may be wrong, our vocabulary imprecise, the analogy imperfect, but there is also
some deep similarity that escapes nobody” (Masson
1997, 1).
But when dogs behave differently from humans—recall
their frenzied greeting, apparently out of proportion to our mere
jaunt to the store—don’t we dismiss it as a kind of stupidity?
“In other words, when dogs do not behave as we do, we assume
it to be irrational behavior” (Masson 1997, 2). Is it coincidental
that this is the same dismissal that women’s “inscrutable” emotional reactions have received for centuries? Aren’t the stupid
emotions of dogs, women and people of color, including their
supposed blind love for the men who abuse them, part of what
proves their irrationality and, so, unfitness for philosophy?
Our relationship to animal love is confused, then, as convoluted as our on and off romance with our own fleshy selves, and
it is a gendered and raced confusion. There is perhaps no story
about somatophobia in Western thought that can’t be traced to
the triptych enshrinement of maleness, whiteness, and humanness. To put it negatively, the discussion of dogs and love is
simultaneously, always and already, a discussion of sexism,
racism, and anthropocentrism. It is an association that helps
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explain the urgency of engaging with the question of animal
love, especially for women. As Anna G. Jónasdóttir urges:
“Concerning love as one of the most vital, and difficult – not the least for women, matters to deal with in
practical life and in theory, it should be particularly urgent for feminists to be (pro)active in this area and not
only re-active to problems and solutions formulated by
male/mainstream theorists” (2013, 25).
The somatophobia that defines women’s experience and
their placement in intellectual history, and that of people of
color, is coextensive with the roles they have been assigned in
sex and love. Is it any wonder that some of us long for escape
from these devastating stereotypes?
My first gesture towards philosophy was almost certainly a
yearning away from suffering, an urge to step back, observe,
categorize and control. I wanted to survey the world from
someplace safe, an aerie from which ambiguity and complexity would be transformed into mere problems to be resolved. I
had understood Aristotle’s definition of the human as rational
animal to mean that we were no longer merely contingently
animal, that we were, at most, barely animal. Read this way,
it’s an escape act of the first order, a sleight of mind that allows
one to believe that she is no longer a mere beast among beasts,
or a thing among things. What I can see by way of my magical
rationality must be object, other than me, even if the other is a
body, especially if it is my body.
People of color and white women—never permitted full
participation in this elevated pretense of elect subjectivity—
have been compared to animals of various sorts and regarded
as somehow more embodied, more mired in immanence, than
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white men. Recent racist speculations and judgments about
Serena Williams—for example, comments about her evident
physical power—are to the point. Such judgments reflect the
relentless somatophobic associations that white supremacist,
Eurocentric culture has drawn for centuries. Against this backdrop, Brittney Cooper explains William’s inspirational, embodied significance:
“That kind of body confidence from a dark-skinned,
‘thick’ Black woman, with a round posterior that all
my homegirls and I, straight and gay alike, admire,
is hard won. This world does not love Black girls or
women, and it takes every opportunity to project its
own ugliness onto our bodies” (2015).
Sometimes the stereotypes are quite specific. For example,
calling a woman a dog means she’s not just an animal, but ugly,
common, and uninteresting, a creature whose value is properly
calculated only relative to man’s purpose and pleasure. All such
denigrations—directed at those others who are stupid, smelly,
bestial, and instinctual—elevate the man of reason by contrast
and serve as a foil to construct the only love that ultimately
matters. This is philosophical love—philosophia—the love of
the idea of love, rather than love itself—or even the love of
love itself—which can be both physically and psychologically
messy. Such pure love is universal, abstract, and pure. It is also
white, male, and human.
But of course I am exaggerating, painting with far too wide
a brush as I indulge my cranky musings. Capable philosophers,
including feminist ones, have resuscitated the likes of Plato,
Descartes, and Kant, delivering them from wholesale critiques
that oversimplify their approaches to emotions and embodi-
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ment. It is a caricature to present them as mechanistic rationalists stomping out every flower of feeling on their quest for
enlightenment. So, for example, Denis Kambouchner complicates the reading of Descartes, reminding us that he ultimately
depicts “love as a chief and prime element of affective life”
and that “love is found in a notable spot: right after wonder,
and before hatred, desire, joy and sadness” (2007, 24). Similarly, Susan James has successfully labored to add nuance to
our appreciation of philosophers who had been crudely treated
by feminists and other critics in the recent past (2000).
Still, one must acknowledge that the rehabilitation of such
champions of dualism goes only so far, for the rationalistic,
paradigmatically philosophical handling of love is indeed a
conceptual one; even among those who took it quite seriously,
as did the “first philosopher of love,” Plato. So, if we are inclined to scold those second-wave feminists for being too hard
on the philosophical superheroes, it is healthy to keep in mind
that “philosophers are indeed in love with ideas, ideas (how
and wherever we may wish to locate their origins) [they] are
what draws one to philosophy, are what philosophers engage
with, are what philosophers teach to students and debate with
each other, and are what philosophers allow themselves to be
consumed by” (Cristaudo 2012, 19).
Whatever abstract functions and roles have been assigned to
emotions and embodiment in these philosophers’ ontological
and epistemological economies, far too often prejudices about
others have served as the scrim against which to bring their
facsimiles of feeling to life. Still on the subject of Plato, for
example, Spelman reminds us that in Theaeteus:
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“The implication is clear: if any old opinion were to
count as real knowledge, then we’d have to say that
women, children, and maybe even animals have knowledge. But surely they don’t have knowledge! And why
not? For one thing, because they don’t recognize the
difference between the material, changing world of appearance, and the invisible, eternal world of Reality”
(Spelman 1982, 116).
None of which is to say that there haven’t been male thinkers on the borders all along, punching at the bricks of the towering, logocentric edifice, some less misogynistic than others.
And certainly, writers and thinkers in other disciplines—philosophers in exile, very often—have also been exploring topics
regarded as alternative or abject in their messy particularity.
All along there have been theoretical sideshows to philosophy’s
main stage. But even subjects that feel edgy, abject or subaltern can ultimately serve to help justify the preeminence of the
main course.
The general cultural focus on sex, for example, which, happily, has helped to open space for exploring sex in scholarly circles, may simultaneously mark love as even more taboo and out
of reach. As a bodily expression, sex is situated squarely on the
outskirts of the intellectually acceptable. But its designation as
the dark underbelly only makes it more appealing, precisely
because of its abject, forbidden character. It evokes prurient
curiosity more than respect. And this very rendition of sex as
subaltern, through the contrast it provides, helps to firm up the
more rarified conceptions of, say, heterosexual, marital love.
The ambivalent and connected valuations of sex and love
are reflected even in thoughtfully philosophical contemporary
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accounts of sex and love such as Soble’s. That he assiduously
assigns sex and love to two separate parts of the book is to the
point. That sex is sometimes treated in starkly gritty terms—
his first remarks about oral sex are not for the faint of heart—is
also to the point (1998, xxxi). The heady, self-conscious analysis surrounding most of his discussion of both sex and love
makes such animalistic moments stand out as voyeuristic or
even pornographic. It is as if the distance Soble-the-philosopher keeps from the body makes his forays into the nasty side
of sex more titillating. It comes as no surprise that Soble uses
the subject of sex, and feminist philosopher Alison Jaggar, as
his example as he schools his readers in the rigors of his discipline. As Soble primly notes:
“Analytic philosophy is, when done well, known for
its clarity, precision, and carefulness. Sometimes it is
not done altogether as it should be. It will be helpful, in
becoming acquainted with the methods of conceptual
philosophy of sex, to examine an example of a wellmeaning attempt at analysis that goes astray – committing the mortal sin of equivocation” (1998, 5).
Jaggar doesn’t just get it wrong in Soble’s eyes; her argument about sex is such a howler that it’s fit to serve as a cautionary tale about the proper practice of the analytic method. The
sexually/philosophically ignorant feminist serves to highlight
Soble’s frank and skillful handling of this earthy, complex, taboo subject.
Perhaps this feminist philosopher can so naturally serve as
a foil to Soble’s razor sharp conceptual parsing because the
norms of Western white masculinity encourage boys to learn to
love wisdom by turning away from sex, women, and even their
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own emotions. It isn’t, of course, as if their feelings are thought
to disappear, but that they are pushed into a handy closet down
the hall. One learns to corral the horses of one’s passion. For
the rational animal, feelings like love are spun into meta-feelings, as Plato’s Symposium is about the idea of love rather than
love itself. By the time the philosopher has subjected love to
analysis, love will no longer be the phenomenon that might
have seduced his interest in the first place.
Do our academic disciplines too cut us into pieces along the
same lines as the dualistic philosophers we now caricature?
Are we further cleaved into mind/body, professional/personal,
rational/emotional by our dedication to the facades we believe
we must maintain to continue to be tolerated in our traditional
fields? Certainly, I did not always thrive in the in-between.
I once reveled in the attention of my philosophy professors,
bearded white men with the power to confirm my intelligence
and exceptionality. They helped me believe that I was, or could
be, so much more than a mere animal/woman. They loved me,
in a way, and I loved being associated with them, so far from
insipidity and vulnerability, the rickety swing set of my mother’s life. Our mothers’ lives.
For to abandon the sharp edges of philosophy is to some
degree to choose a woman’s life, a womanly life, whether one
is, in fact, a woman or man. Her life imbued with, steeped
in, percolated from, the mundane even as it props up the celebrated, the arcane, the profound. As Adrienne Rich wrote: “I
have a very clear, keen memory of myself the day after I was
married: I was sweeping a floor . . . This is an age-old action,
this is what women have always done” (1986, 25). To be a woman
is to be there, amidst the detritus and droppings of everyday
life; it is to feel oneself most oneself among the preconditions
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and leftovers of embodiment, the dirty dishes, the laundry, the
shitty diapers, the garden soil.
To fully acknowledge, let alone to embrace, this bodily side
of life is to renounce one’s claim to the philosophical lineage as
it has been defined. There is no way around it, though one may
try to make compromises. I have gotten by as a sort-of, halfassed philosopher who writes about animals, or, in another
oblique gesture of avoidance, a philosopher who writes about
philosophers who write about animals. It is liberating to feel
almost done with that. And to have the renunciation arise not
from principle —it is not as if I am against philosophy — but
from lack of desire, as the dog abandons the bone, eventually,
from apathy or exhaustion, or because a squirrel has darted
across the yard. Could the promise of truth or tenure or sainthood really be more compelling than a chatty squirrel just out
of reach? And would I want to leave my dogs there, rejected,
longing for me outside these campus walls?
I do not know if it is right to call it love, what I feel for my
dogs, but then I do not know if it is right to denote as love what
I feel for my partner or my sister or my dead mother. This intimate distance we have with dogs is an evocative enigma. As
Masson writes:
“The closeness between dogs and people is taken for
granted and, at the same time, seen as something immensely mysterious. Naturally I feel close to my dogs,
but who are these dogs? . . . Just who are these beings
lying here, so close to me, and yet also so remote? They
are easily grasped, and they are unfathomable” (Masson, 1997).

http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/

Vol. 23, Issue 1

43
Catherine Bailey

It feels like love and it feels radical. To love a dog, or anyone,
not just as an object or property, or as a cherished plaything,
but as a being, to love the beingness of this other.
As Masson writes of his dog:
“There were just the two of us sitting in the living
room, and it was very quiet. I looked over at Sasha and
noticed that she was looking at me. Suddenly I was
overwhelmed with the thought: There is another being
in this room, another consciousness. There is somebody here besides me” (1997).
And don’t we all share creaturely being with these animals,
though it may feel important for us to pretend otherwise? So
much conspires to persuade us of how unlike we are, but true
dog love calls it into question, threatening this order of things.
Nib, the 18-pounder, meditates with me each morning, her
dense weight pinning me to the earth, her ragged breath metronymic, as present as my own silent ins and outs. From the
rooted body we form, we rise together as spirit, like smoke, to
the heavens, our morning breath lifting us toward enlightenment until the needs for tea and kibble shatter the illusion.
Is it presumptuous to draw this tenuous connection between
my dog and enlightenment? What if I mean to refer not to the
white-hot blast enlightenment of the phoenix, but the subdued,
grunting, gradual awakening of the aging mutt?
Perhaps it’s enough to say, then, that I am giving up knowing
as a philosopher in favor of knowing as a creature among creatures. But am I seeking knowledge in my daily humbling as I
watch their tails rise like semaphores in the breeze, their brows
furrow at the puzzle of scent or sound? Do I glean philosophi-
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cal insights? “A dog can never tell you what she knows from
the smells of the world, but you know, watching her, that you
know almost nothing,” writes Oliver (2013, 27). We can refer to
this poet’s curiosity as epistemological—does it sound better
that way?—but can this be accurate if one’s ultimate goal is impressionistically disclosive rather than discursively delineated?
It, whatever it is, does not seem to respond to our arbitrary
names in any case.
I confess that I learned to speak of ethics without ever mentioning compassion or love except as a contrast to reason. And
that was me reciting Kant’s categorical imperative to slackjawed freshman who were lost as it is only possible to be in a
Minnesota winter. They came for nourishment and, aspiring
philosopher that I was, I gave them arguments. Would my students have been better or worse off if I had served them pizza
and beer instead of this brand of ethics? For what if the philosophical enterprise isn’t simply produced by a mind vaguely
linked to a body but is itself a flowering of, or maybe an excretion of, our particular embodiment? Is this the direction James
points to when he says that the philosopher recognizes rationality “as he recognizes everything else, by certain subjective
marks with which it affects him.... The transition from a state
of puzzle and perplexity to rational comprehension is full of
lively relief and pleasure” (1879, 317). It is an intellectual longing and satisfaction all right, but it is rooted in the body.
Is a being generally predisposed to satisfaction, say, a properly adored dog, unfit for knowledge seeking as the philosopher
conceives of it? Surely the caricature of the scientist or philosopher includes a restless quality that we are supposed to admire.
He is driven to seek, must know, will not be satisfied until he
learns the truth. The philosopher-hero is fundamentally itchy.
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And so, when Mill says it is better to be Socrates dissatisfied
than a happy pig, we, like the pig, must dumbly concur (1861,
260).
For pigs or dogs the hunger is for food or stroking, or play or
rest, an asking that can be answered. For the philosopher, we
are meant to understand, there is an interiority, the fundamental character of which is a healthy desire, a robust sense of lack.
The philosopher wrestles and wrests. He sculpts, fleshes out,
unpacks, elucidates, deduces. He is relentless in his analytic
quest. His mental activities are the manly, heroic adventures of
Lewis and Clark, or George Washington. Not only is the philosopher never satisfied, he is righteously proud of never being
satisfied, the devil’s advocate who never tires. After all, doesn’t
intellectual complacency suggest that one is either stupid or not
paying attention?
And so the dog emerges guilelessly from a primordial soup
of creaturely plenitude, wearing an easy satisfaction with the
here and now, hungry only for the comforts and challenges of
play and love and food and shaft of sunlight. No wonder women are regarded as dogs, given that women have been thought
to share the dog’s intellectual passivity, unless they—I mean
we, of course—are conniving, cat-like, to manipulate men. The
male mind seeks out, pokes and prods—recall Bacon’s raping
scientist—while the woman or Black man (or entire continent
of Africa) is regarded as lolling, passive. Satisfied, is a reproach
leveled at one who settles vapid and cow-like, accepting chainlink limits on the mind and spirit.
The restless raptor’s radar picks out the rabbit against the
dappled backdrop of sun, air current and shadow while the dog
blithely shares the rodent’s mammal plane. For the dog, there
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is no climbing out of this furry stratum to survey the situation,
no deus ex machina to transport the dog from its grounded
obscurity. But is the view from the mountaintop truer than the
one from the ground? Is it more beautiful? From which point
of view do such judgments become meaningful? What fuller
truth could there be than what is here in this wet-fur-slobber,
pricking-whisker proximity? Higher truth? Higher than what?
They may assess me from such altitudes and imagine they
measure me entirely, but from there they cannot even catch my
scent.
I rebel against this cartoon philosophy I have drawn, but in
my floundering I sometimes latch onto this word pragmatist,
though it is still a name for philosophers of a sort, still a serious title. Why? Is it to reassure myself that I could still count
amid the world of white men and their ideas? Musing animal
that I am, drawn inexorably into this web of wondering, what if
I refuse philosophy altogether or it refuses me? Am I even capable of leaving it behind? What should I call myself as I gorge
on esoteric language I know will leave me bloated and regretful? I say that I theorize now as a shameless lover of dogs, but
isn’t that just another denial and pretense? And why is it never
enough to simply state that I am a woman, impelled by desire
and lassitude and a curiosity that does not, as it turns out, begin
and end with either my nose or my intellect?
What can love studies mean in this battered, beleaguered
context? Is it merely the culmination of outsider scholars from
across the spectrum who could find no respect or traction for
their impulses toward love in their first disciplinary families?
Is love studies, then, another queer academic movement in its
insistence that what is closest to our hearts no longer be furthest from our dissertations? As Ferguson reminds us, “ . . .
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there has been a huge gap between, on the one hand, how most
people think (or ‘what people know’) about love, that it is one
of the most valuable ‘things’ in human life, and on the other
hand, the rejection, ridiculing, or at best marginalization of
love as a topic for serious studies in much of academia” (2013,
1). Can it be that this is not an accident? That precisely how one
announces oneself as a serious academic—code for philosopher since many of us are, after all, doctors of philosophy—is
through the renunciation of love, especially the crass love of
mere animals and other bodies?
Of course, love hasn’t been entirely neglected in the academy. But it is rare that love has been treated attentively, lovingly, in a way that respects the integrity of what it is, as what
it is. As Jónasdóttir explains, love has rarely been considered
as a force in its own right, but rather as an epiphenomenon of
other, more fundamental, aspects of reality. For example, it has
been explored as “merely a sublimated sexual energy (libido)”
or “an ideological phenomenon of the cultural superstructure
(helping maintain the bourgeois hegemony)” (2013, 19, emphasis in original). Love has received attention, but on the way
to something else, on a journey to some other more serious,
respectable concern.
Is it an accident that James turned to the dog to reflect and
describe his pragmatist musings? He understood that something fundamental was reflected in this form of close attention
to these nearby, elusive creatures. James always loved dogs and
because of love he could properly see them. And perhaps partly
because, as a privileged white man, he was not overly driven
to prove himself as a philosopher—he is known as the father
of psychology after all, and born as much from literature and
medicine as from philosophy—; he could indulge such senti-

http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/

Vol. 23, Issue 1

48
Catherine Bailey

mental concerns. Certainly, James took seriously the notion of
sympathy and his exercises of loving attention to dogs are also
(at least) attempts to occupy their point of view. It’s not so differently from how a poet may listen to dogs: “The dog would
remind us of the pleasures of the body with its graceful physicality, and the acuity and rapture of the senses, and the beauty
of forest and ocean and rain and our own breath. There is not a
dog that romps and runs but we learn from him” (Oliver 2013,
118-1119).
That we can learn from our encounters with dogs in ways
that are dramatic and trivial is surely indisputable. In this vein,
we have milked them for scientific purposes; in heinous acts of
objectification we have even nailed them to boards and dissected them live to satisfy curiosities both passing and profound.
From them we can learn about the limitations of our understandings of what it is to know, to be, and to feel. That dogs
are useful to us is not in question. But what would it be like to
inhabit a richer conception of dog love that does not reduce the
dog to mere prop for human realization and catharsis? To enter
into relational exchange with the dog in a way that goes beyond
exploitation and appropriation?
To love dogs in the language of a poet or outsider scholar
can be almost as silly as to be a dog at her most flounderingly
foolish. And yet we cannot resist these gullible, often goofy
creatures, be we philosophers, neonatal nurses or backhoe
operators. We invite dogs into our worlds and fall into theirs,
engaging in an unequal dance that teeters on the edge of the
perverse. As Masson sees it, “To a certain extent, we are the
jailers of dogs, since any freedom they achieve must be acquired by wheedling it out of us. This is one good reason they
learn to read us so well. Survival dictates that dogs learn about
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us and learn to play us to some extent” (1997). It is a queer kind
of love indeed, as revelatory of our shames and hungers as of
our aspirations and ambitions. What else could it be given the
position we have assigned to ourselves between the angels and
beasts? We float up up only to discover that we ache for the rubbing of earthly embodiment. We lampoon the dog, belittle him,
abuse him, only to find that we long for his rude, wet-nosed
attentions. We carry pictures of our dogs into faculty meetings,
physics conferences, and high courts, but mostly they remain
hidden in our smartphones, together with our menstrual calendars and grocery lists.
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